A more detailed position description can be found at http://employment.uow.edu.au/jobapp/, position number 24094.

The closing date for applications is 31 January, 2012.

We’re a small but energetic group of philosophers looking for a colleague who’s interested in working with us to elevate UOW Philosophy a step further. We are looking for a candidate who will complement our existing strengths and help expand and develop our program.

For more information, contact Patrick McGivern, Philosophy Program Convenor at patrickm@uow.edu.au or by phone at +61 2 4221 5676

Title: Inferential Virtues

When and where: Wednesday, October 26th, 4:30pm in 19.1003

Abstract: The possibility of epistemic luck has long provoked a Pyrrhonian disdain of finding gold in the darkness, but the attempt to devise an account of knowledge that accounts for this intuition stumbles when confronted by Gettier-style scenarios. Recently Pritchard has suggested that an appropriate combination of virtue epistemology and anti-luck epistemology will meet the Pyrrhonian’s needs. I suggest that this solution at least depends on a satisfactory incorporation of pragmatist insights – specifically aspects of inferentialism – if it is to satisfactorily account for the place of epistemic agents.

Title: Enhancement and Obsolescence: Avoiding an “Enhanced Rat Race”

When and where: Wednesday, October 12th, 4:30-6:30 in 19.1003

Abstract: An increasing number of philosophers are now taking seriously the possibility that in the not-too-distant future it will become possible to enhance human beings in various ways, making them stronger, faster, more intelligent, longer lived, and perhaps even “post-human”. A claim about continuing technological progress plays an essential role in this literature. Advocates for enhancement typically point to the rapid progress being made in the development of biotechnologies, information technology, and nanotechnology as evidence that we will soon be able to achieve significant improvements on normal human capacities through applications of these technologies. In this paper, I will argue that – should it eventuate – continuous improvement in enhancement technologies may prove more bane than benefit. A rapid increase in the power of available enhancements would mean that each cohort of enhanced individuals will find itself in danger of being outcompeted by the next in competition for important social goods – a situation I characterise as an “enhanced rat race”. Rather than risk the chance of being rendered technologically and socially obsolete by the time one is twenty-five, it may be rational to prefer that a wide range of enhancements that would generate positional disadvantages that outweigh their absolute advantages be prohibited altogether. The danger of an enhanced rat race therefore constitutes a novel argument in favour of abandoning the pursuit of certain sorts of enhancements.

Dr. Robert Sparrow is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies at Monash University and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, at the University of Sydney.

hostgator promos

Here’s the book’s own blurb:

This book employs the theoretical framework of ‘speech act theory’ to analyse current legislative frameworks and cases pertaining to sedition or the advocacy of violence and the issue of freedom of speech. An analysis of the relation between speech and action offers a promising way of clarifying confusion over the contested status of speech, which advocates violence as a political strategy. This account reflects an understanding of philosophical issues about both the nature of freedom and speech and how these issues can be applied to concrete legal problems.

Order your copies soon!

The film will start at 5:30 in room 19.G016. Bring your own popcorn!

Title: Phenomenally social – the private and public nature of conscious experience

When & where: Wednesday, September 7th, 4:30-6:30 in 19.1003

Abstract: Conscious experience is usually portrayed as so inherently private that its actual role in our cognitive lives becomes deeply puzzling. This talk discusses a solution to this puzzle, suggested by social cognitive neuroscience: that the role of conscious experience is in fact social. Introspected conscious perception is for joint decision-making, and our experience of agency and choice is for common knowledge and social cohesion. Part of the proposal is that conscious experience can play this public role, not in spite of the privacy, but in virtue of the privacy.

This seminar is funded by UOW’s Institute for Social Transformation Research, as part of the Cognitive Niche Construction project.

For more information, contact Patrick McGivern at patrickm@uow.edu.au

Title: Persuasive Force and Liberal Autonomy: How Violent Protest Can be Democratic

When: Wednesday, August 24th at 4:30pm

Where: UOW, building 19, room 1003.

Abstract: In this talk, I analyse the relationship between civil disobedience and non-violence in a liberal democracy. Since Rawls’ definition in 1971, there has been general agreement that for an act of social protest to be compatible with the rules of a democracy it has to be ‘non-violent’. That is, it has to be an attempt to persuade, rather than coerce, others that a particular law need be revised or repealed. According to this view, while a peaceful protest can represent a valuable form of communication in a democratic society, and lead the majority in power to understand the protesters’ plea, violent protests constitute an attempt to coerce the majority in power to yield to the activists’ demand, and are incompatible with the values of a liberal democracy. I will question this idea, arguing that a protest involving force or violence does not necessarily constitute a ‘coercive’ act. Drawing on the work of Joel Feinberg, Gerald Dworkin, and Joseph Raz, I will argue that acts that force people to act in a certain way are not necessarily disrespectful of their autonomy. Rather, the duty to respect others as autonomous choice-makers might require, under some circumstances, using force or even violence to address them. First, I will propose that the notion of ‘autonomy’ be kept distinct from that of ‘freedom’. Second, I will argue that the infringement of one’s freedom might be necessary to protect and promote her autonomy. If this is tenable, we then have an argument to the conclusion that both non violent and (some forms of) violent civil disobedience can be justified in a liberal democracy as persuasive acts of communication that treat fellow citizens as autonomous agents.

For more information, contact Patrick McGivern at patrickm@uow.edu.au

The title of Professor Pogge’s talk will be “Global Justice”. The seminar will be held at 4:30pm in room 19.1056 (please note the change from our usual room for this occasion).

Professor Pogge is Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University, and a Professorial Fellow at   the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at ANU. He is internationally renowned for his work on global poverty, global health, and global justice, as is widely regarded as one of the world’s leading experts in moral philosophy and ethics.